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Introduction	
	Many	economic	philosophies	–whether	subscribed	to	by	left	or	right	wing	politicians	or	economists-	have	as	their	shared	aim	to	promote	economic	growth	rates.	Such	growth	in	output	is	seen	as	the	solution	to	many	problems,	including	reducing	unemployment	and	increasing	household	income	levels.	A	key	area	of	contention	between	right	and	left	is	whether	 such	 growth	 should	 be	 achieved	 primarily	 by	 actions	 taken	 in	 the	 private	sector	or	those	organized	by	a	government.		Main	 drivers	 to	 support	 economic	 growth	 include	 the	 option	 of	 additional	 fiscal	spending	and/or	the	use	of	monetary	policy	in	which	a	central	bank’s	interest	rate	plays	a	key	role.	After	2008,	central	banks	introduced	quantitative	easing	in	the	policy	mix.		Output	growth	reflects	a	short-term	positive	change	in	the	volume	of	goods	and	services	produced.	 Output	 growth	 does	 not	 reflect	 the	 changes	 taking	 place	 in	 individual	household	disposable	income	levels,	their	debt	obligations	or	their	employment	status.	Output	 growth	does	 neither	 reflect	 government	 nor	 corporate	 debt	 levels	 nor	 does	 it	reflect	the	savings	built	up	in	pension	funds	and	the	lending	based	on	such	savings.		In	the	U.S.	over	the	period	1997-2007	total	household	mortgage	debt	as	a	percentage	of	nominal	GDP	grew	from	43.6%	in	1997	to	73.3%	by	2007:	a	debt	explosion	relative	to	income	growth	levels.		The	Federal	Reserve	took	no	action	to	slow	down	this	debt	accumulation	when	it	was	happening.		In	the	aftermath,	due	to	its	nature,	the	Federal	Reserve	was	not	equipped	to	help	individual	households	with	their	subsequent	liquidity	crisis.	It	could	do	nothing	for	the	23.250	million	households	who	were	confronted	with	foreclosure	proceedings	over	the	 period	 2005-2014.	 Lowering	 interest	 rates	 does	 not	 solve	 outstanding	 household	debt	 problems	 and	 neither	 does	 buying	 up	 government	 bonds	 or	 mortgage-backed	securities.		The	 commercial	 banking	 sector	 was	 no	 help	 either.	 Their	 overriding	 profit	 objective	forced	 them	 to	 claim	 back	 outstanding	 mortgage	 debt	 as	 quickly	 as	 possible,	irrespective	of	the	economic	consequences.		The	U.S.	government	saw	its	revenues	drop	by	$3	trillion	over	the	period	2007-2015	as	a	 consequence	 of	 the	 household	 debt	 crisis.	 It	 also	 borrowed	 and	 spent	 another	 $7	trillion	 to	help	restore	economic	growth	over	 this	period.	The	result	was	a	 lack-luster	period	of	economic	growth.			Economic	 evidence	 supports	 the	 view	 that	 households	 should	 have	 been	 helped	 in	overcoming	their	 liquidity	squeeze.	A	lender	of	 last	resort	for	individual	households	is	needed.	Once	operational,	the	myth	of	economic	growth	will	turn	into	reality.					
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1.	Economic	growth	and	economic	reality	
	
1.1	The	disturbance	factors	In	western	societies	the	main	economic	theories	are	based	on	markets	and	how	markets	can	 adjust	 themselves.	When	markets	do	not	deliver	 the	desired	 results,	 especially	 in	respect	 to	 economic	 growth	 levels,	 fiscal	 and	monetary	policies	 have	been	devised	 to	help	to	correct	the	imbalances.		To	help	overcome	the	effects	of	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis,	central	banks	in	the	U.S.,	in	Europe	and	in	Japan	have	resorted	to	lowering	interest	rates	to	historical	lows.	Such	lows	have	been	maintained	from	2008	to	well	into	2016	and	few	indications	are	at	hand	that	these	rates	might	return	to	pre	2008	levels	any	time	soon.	The	same	central	banks	have	also	entered	 the	government	bond	markets	by	 initiating	substantial	programs	of	buying	up	such	bonds	and	in	the	case	of	the	U.S.	also	of	mortgage	backed	securities.	In	Europe,	the	ECB	and	the	Bank	of	England	did	buy	some	corporate	bonds	as	well.		The	 side	 effects	 of	 both	 these	measures	 have	 been	 that	 the	 banking	 sectors	 on	 both	sides	of	the	Atlantic	have	been	hammered	in	ways	that	was	unforeseeable	back	in	2008.	Banks’	profit	 levels	are,	to	a	 large	extent,	dependent	on	interest	rate	margins	between	the	 interest	 rates	charged	 to	 their	borrowing	customers	and	 the	 interest	paid	 to	 their	fund	providers.	In	the	environment	of	stricter	central	bank	rules	and	a	much	greater	use	of	Internet	banking	coupled	with	a	very	low	base	rate,	great	pressure	has	been	put	on	the	net	interest	rate	margins.	If	banks	can’t	make	sufficient	profits	out	of	their	core	role	of	 lending	 to	 their	 customers,	 their	 ability	 to	 help	 finance	 future	 borrowings	 is	 also	impaired.	On	top	of	this,	the	activity	of	quantitative	easing	has	caused	long-term	interest	rates	 to	 drop	 to	 very	 low	 and	 sometimes	 even	 negative	 interest	 rates,	 especially	 for	governments’	 borrowings.	 Again	 banks	 are	 severely	 hampered	 in	 their	 profit	making	activities	in	that	under	current	market	conditions	having	a	government	bond	portfolio	on	their	books	can	barely	add	to	their	profit	levels.	The	banking	situation	is	more	fragile	in	Europe	 than	 in	 the	U.S.	 as	U.S.	banks	have	been	strongly	encouraged	 to	 raise	more	equity	 capital	 over	 the	 past	 few	 years.	 In	 the	 U.S.	 the	 level	 of	 doubtful	 debtors	 is	generally	lower	than	in	some	European	countries.	The	IMF	reports	that	global	debt	now	stands	at	$152	trillion,	of	which	two	third	are	carried	by	liabilities	of	the	private	sector.		Not	 only	 banks	 are	 under	 pressure,	 but	 also	 life	 insurance	 companies	 and	 pension	funds.	The	IMF	in	its	global	financial	stability	report	of	October	5,	20161	concludes	that:	“The	solvency	of	many	 life	 insurance	companies	and	pension	 funds	 is	 threatened	by	a	prolonged	period	of	low	interest	rates.”		In	an	article	in	the	Sunday	Times	of	20	October	2016	 another	 side	 effect	was	mentioned:	 “Dividends	 set	 to	 disappear	 into	 a	 pensions	black	hole”.	The	corporate	sector	in	the	U.K.	could	be	forced	to	pay	substantially	more	into	 their	 defined	 benefits	 pension	 funds	 as	 the	 deficit	 has	 hit	 a	 record	 high	 of	 £710	billion	in	August	2016	according	to	PricewaterhouseCoopers2.	This	deficit	was	just	£250																																																											1	https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/	2	http://pwc.blogs.com/press_room/2016/08/pension-deficit-grows-by-100bn-in-a-month-according-to-pwcs-skyval-index-.html	
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																																																																																																																			The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		million	ten	years	ago.	Companies	are	closing	such	DB	schemes	as	 fast	as	they	can,	but	this	 only	 means	 that	 the	 risks	 of	 low	 interest	 rates	 are	 transferred	 to	 individual	households,	who	now	face	an	uphill	struggle	to	provide	for	a	decent	pension	in	old	age.	The	risks	to	society	as	a	whole	do	not	disappear;	they	are	only	transferred	to	individual	households	who	have	no	way	of	defending	themselves.		When	banks,	life	insurance	companies	and	pension	funds	are	all	under	severe	pressure,	one	must	wonder	whether	and	how	such	a	 situation	arose	and	what	could	have	been	done	differently.		
1.2	Economic	growth	levels	in	the	U.S.	before	and	after	the	financial	crisis	
	It	 is	probably	appropriate	 to	make	a	case	study	of	 the	U.S.	experience	as	 the	 financial	crisis	originated	in	that	country.			Economic	 growth	 figures	 are	based	on	 real	GDP	data;	 data	 that	 take	out	 the	 inflation	level.			Table	1	provides	an	overview	of	U.S.	economic	growth	rates,	real	GDP	levels	(2009	=	100)	and	inflation	levels	over	the	period	1997-2015.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																																							
	
	
	
	
	 6	
	
																																																																	The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning	
	
Table	1:		U.S	economic	growth	rates,	real	GDP	levels	and	inflation	rates	
1997-2015	
	
	
Year	 Econ.	
Growth	
Rate	
%	
Real	
GDP	
$	trillion	
	
Inflation	
%	
		Year	 Econ.	
Growth	
Rate	
%	
Real		
GDP	
$	trillion	
Inflation	
%	
1997	
	
4.5%	 11.035												1.7%	 		2007	 	1.8%	 14.874	 4.1%	
1998	
	
4.5%	 11.526	 1.6%	 		2008	 	-0.3%	 14.830	 0.1%	
1999	
	
4.7%	 12.066	 2.7%	 		2009	 	-2.8%	 14.419	 2.7%	
2000	
	
4.1%	 12.560	 3.4%	 		2010	 	2.5%	 14.784	 1.5%	
2001	
	
1.0%	 12.682	 1.6%	 		2011	 	1.6%	 15.021	 3.0%	
2002	
	
1.8%	 12.909	 2.4%	 		2012	 	2.2%	 15.355	 1.7%	
2003	
	
2.8%	 13.271	 1.9%	 		2013	 	1.7%	 15.612	 1.5%	
2004	
	
3.8%	 13.774	 0.3%	 		2014	 	2.4%	 15.982	 0.8%	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2005	 3.3%	
	
14.234	 3.4%	 		2015	 	2.6%	 16.397	 0.7%	
2006	
	
2.7%	 14.674	 2.5%	 	 	 	 	
																																																																																	
	In	the	year	2000,	a	number	of	Internet	companies	went	under	in	the	so-called	dot.com	bubble.	Another	event	was	that	the	Federal	Reserve	raised	its	base	rate	to	6.5%	in	order	to	 reduce	 inflation	 pressures.	 In	 2001	 the	 nervousness	 in	 the	 financial	 markets,	 the	event	 of	 9/11	 and	 the	 changed	 political	 landscape,	 especially	 about	 Iraq,	 made	 the	company	sector	slow	down	investments.	The	economic	growth	level	dropped	to	1%	and	unemployment	was	to	rise	to	6%	in	2002.	In	2002	the	Federal	Reserve	lowered	its	base	rate	to	1%.		The	real	question	is:	Are	recessions	foreseeable	and	if	so	what	could	be	done	to	alleviate	the	pressures	on	individuals	and	on	the	economy	in	general.		This	is	not	just	a	question	for	the	U.S.	economy,	but	for	all	economies	in	the	world.	What	has	changed	is	the	way	that	economic	growth	has	been	achieved	over	time.	The	change	is	linked	to	borrowing	levels.	The	IMF	in	its	latest	reports3	estimates	the	2016	world’s	GDP	at	current	prices	stands	at	$74	trillion.	It	also	assessed	that	the	world’s	debt	levels	for	2016	stand	at	$152	trillion.	Debt	to	output	levels	worldwide	is	currently	running	at	205%.	According	to	the	IMF	two	third	of	the	debt	is	taken	up	by	the																																																										3	http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/pdf/tblparta.pdf	
	 7	
																																																																																																																																																																																																																												The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		private	sector,	or	around	140%	compared	to	output	levels.	These	debt	levels,	especially	the	changes	therein,	can	cause	major	disruptions	to	economic	growth	rates.			
1.3	Government	debt	and	long-term	household	debt	in	the	U.S.	compared	to		
nominal	GDP	over	the	period	1997-2015	
	The	 two	 main	 types	 of	 long-term	 debt	 that	 are	 not	 linked	 to	 profit	 making	 are:	individual	 household’	 mortgage	 debt	 and	 government	 debt.	 Student	 loans	 are	 also	 a	type	of	long-term	debt	and	can	be	regarded	as	a	debt	on	future	earnings.	However	since	the	volume	of	student	loans	in	the	U.S.	has	only	recently	exceeded	the	$1	trillion	mark,	they	have	not	been	included	in	the	figures	below.		Debts	of	any	type	need	debt	servicing	out	of	current	income.	Hence	such	debts	need	to	be	compared	to	nominal	GDP	data.	
	In	table	2	U.S.	nominal	GDP	data	are	compared	to	the	outstanding	mortgage	debt	and	to	the	U.S.	Federal	government	debt	levels	over	the	period	1997-2015.		
	
Table	2:	U.S.	nominal	GDP	in	U.S.$	trillions	and	the	outstanding	mortgage	levels		
and	Federal	Government	debt	levels	as	a	percentage	of	nominal	GDP	1997-2015	
		
Year	
	
Nominal	
GDP	x	
$	trillion	
Total	
Mortgage	
Debt	as	
%	of	GDP	
Total		
Fed.	Gvt	
Debt	 as	 as		
%	of	GDP	
				Year	 Nominal	
GDP	x	
$	trillion	
Total	
Mortgage		
Debt	as	
%	of	GDP	
Total	
Fed.Gvt		
Debt	as	
%	of	GDP	
1997	
	
		8.609	 				43.6%	 			62.6%	 				2007	 14.478	 				73.3%	 			62.8%	
1998	 		9.089	 				44.6%	 			60.2%	 				2008	 14.719	 					71.9%	 			73.5%	
1999	
	
		9.661	 					45.9%	 				58.2%	 				2009	 14.419	 					72.3%	 			84.5%	
2000	
	
10.285	 					46.8%	 			54.1%	 				2010	 14.964	 				66.3%	 			92.1%	
2001	
	
10.622	 				50.1%	 			55.1%	 				2011	 15.518	 					62.5%	 			96.4%	
2002	
	
10.978	 					54.9%	 			57.7%	 				2012	 16.155	 					58.7%	 	100.8%	
2003	
	
11.511	 				60.0%	 			59.2%	 				2013	 16.692	 					56.3%	 	100.9%	
2004	
	
12.275	 				64.0%	 				60.5%	 				2014	 17.393	 				54.0%	 	102.5%	
2005	
	
13.094	 				68.1%	 			61.1%	 				2015	 18.036	 					52.6%	 	103.8%	
2006	
	
13.856	 				71.5%	 			61.7%	 	 	 	 	
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																																																																												The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		The	main	conclusion	out	of	tables	1	and	2	is	that	changes	in	the	long-term	debt	situation	of	 individual	 households	 can	have	both	positive,	 but	 also	 strongly	 negative	 effects	 on	short-term	 economic	 growth.	 Table	 1	 shows	 a	 positive	 short-term	 growth	 level	 for	2010,	but	the	long-term	household	debt	problems,	especially	mortgage	debt	levels,	had	not	been	solved,	as	table	2	shows.		Another	fascinating	fact	is	that	U.S.	government	debt	barely	 changed	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 nominal	 GDP	 over	 the	 period	 1997-2007,	 but	dramatically	increased	from	2008	onwards.		Households’	mortgage	 debt	 levels	 increased	 very	 rapidly	 from	2001	 to	 2007,	 both	 in	actual	levels	and	more	importantly	as	a	percentage	of	nominal	GDP	levels.	The	national	gearing	 ratio	 on	 mortgage	 debt	 went	 up	 and	 up	 over	 this	 period.	 The	 IMF	 in	 its	International	 Financial	 Statistics	 overview	 for	 the	 period	 1990-2003	 assessed	 U.S.	household	consumption	level	at	67.8%	of	GDP.			The	clash	that	occurred	over	the	period	2001-2007	was	that	when	the	growth	in	long-term	 household	 debt	 far	 outstripped	 GDP	 levels,	 at	 some	 stage	 the	 repayment	obligations	would	force	consumption	levels	to	be	reduced.	The	statistics	on	foreclosure	filings	provide	the	clearest	 indication	for	the	start	of	 the	turn	around	point.	When	the	filings	 level	 starts	 to	 go	 up,	 the	 finance	 providers	 put	 households	 under	 increasing	pressure	 to	 allocate	 more	 of	 their	 income	 to	 debt	 servicing.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 reduced	macro-economic	consumption	level.	If	this	happens	on	a	large	scale	as	happened	in	the	U.S.	 over	 the	 period	 2005	 to	 2014	when	 23.250	million	 households	were	 confronted	with	foreclosure	filings	out	of	the	51.6	million	households	who	had	a	mortgage	in	2007,	then	a	recession	and	a	slow	growth	period	sets	in.			In	 the	 U.S.	 case,	 the	 financial	markets	 through	 their	 extensive	 use	 of	mortgage-backed	securities	accelerated	the	process.	These	securities	were	daily	tradable	and	in	2007	the	French	bank	BNP	Paribas	stopped	trading	in	three	funds	as	there	was	no	liquidity	in	the	market	 any	 longer.	U.S.	 long-term	mortgage	debt	 had	been	 converted	 to	daily	 tradable	instruments	for	sale	in	the	U.S.	but	also	in	many	countries	outside	the	U.S.	In	2007/2008	generally	 banks	 around	 the	 world	 did	 no	 longer	 trust	 one	 another	 and	 the	 financial	system	came	under	immense	liquidity	pressures.	Some	banks	like	Lehman	Brothers	went	under.		What	 has	 often	 been	 overlooked	 or	 just	 accepted	 as	 consequence	 of	 a	 free	 market	philosophy	is	that	the	debt	service	obligations	from	a	mortgage	debt	do	not	only	affect	an	individual	household	but	also	equally	influence	the	macro-economic	situation.			In	 1997	 the	 total	U.S.	mortgage	debt	 constituted	43.6%	of	Nominal	GDP.	 In	 the	 same	year	 the	number	of	new	housing	 starts	were	1.5	million.	 If	 in	1997	all	new	mortgage	lending	 would	 have	 been	 allocated	 to	 newly	 built	 homes,	 each	 home	 would	 have	 a	mortgage	attached	to	it	on	average	of	$227,580	while	the	average	U.S.	home	sale	price	was	 $	 176,200.	 The	 volume	 of	mortgage	 lending	 per	 new	 home	was	 already	 slightly	above	 the	 average	 price	 level	 of	 existing	 homes.	 Such	 a	 situation	 forces	 the	 prices	 of	existing	homes	to	go	up.	If	from	1997	average	house	prices	had	followed	the	CPI	index,				
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																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		the	2007	average	home	sale	price	would	have	amounted	to	$235,710.	The	actual	 level	was	$313,600	or	33%	above	the	CPI	indexed	house	price.		Such	house	price	inflation,	far	above	 the	 CPI	 inflation	 level,	 can	 be	 directly	 attributed	 to	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 total	mortgage	 debt	 level	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 nominal	 GDP.	 In	 1997	 this	 percentage	 was	43.6%;	by	2007	it	had	reached	73.3%.	The	volume	of	mortgage	lending	over	the	period	1997-2007	was	the	cause	that	in	2007	new	homebuyers	had	to	pay	a	premium	of	33%	over	what	 their	 average	 income	 could	 bear.	 The	 growth	 in	 average	 income	 has	 been	assumed	as	following	the	nominal	growth	in	GDP	of	the	economy.		Those	families	lucky	enough	to	have	sufficient	savings	to	purchase	a	home	outright	were	not	directly	affected	by	 the	mortgage	 crisis.	 Based	 on	 past	 experience	many	 of	 those	 richer	 families	were	willing	to	take	a	punt	on	a	future	appreciation	in	house	prices.	The	real	losers	were	the	lower	and	middle-income	classes,	not	 rich	enough	 to	buy	a	home	outright	out	of	own	funds:	the	working	class	households.		
	
1.4	The	economic	impact	of	the	overpriced	U.S.	housing	market	
	
1.4.1	The	process	of	forcing	households	to	repay	outstanding	mortgages	
	The	statistics	for	foreclosure	filings,	completed	foreclosures	and	home	repossessions	all	point	to	the	deeply	negative	economic	effects	as	a	result	of	a	period	of	excess	lending	to	individual	households.	Between	2005	and	2014	over	23.250	million	households	were	confronted	 with	 foreclosure	 filings 4 .	 This	 compares	 to	 the	 about	 51.6	 million	households	who	in	2007	had	a	mortgage	in	the	U.S.	More	than	45%	of	homeowners	with	a	mortgage	were	confronted	with	a	 foreclosure	 filing	over	 this	period.	 It	 is	very	 likely	that	the	groups	most	affected	were	the	younger	workers,	the	under	35	generation,	and	the	working	 class	 households,	 as	 their	 income	 and	 savings	 levels	 were	 generally	 the	lowest.	 What	 this	 amazing	 figure	 also	 shows	 is	 how	 poor	 the	 macro-economic	 risk	management	 structure	 had	 been	 in	 the	 run	 up	 to	 2007.	 It	 is	 very	 unlikely	 that	 an	individual	 household	 was	 confronted	 twice	 with	 a	 foreclosure	 filing;	 therefore	 each	filing	meant	a	filing	against	a	different	household.		The	 foreclosure	 filings	 led	 to	 18.3	million	 of	 completed	 foreclosures	 over	 the	 period	2005-2014.	The	ultimate	penalty	 for	being	unable	 to	service	an	outstanding	mortgage	debt	 is	 a	 home	 repossession.	 Over	 the	 period	 2006-2014	 6,145,000	 homes	 were	repossessed.	 	This	 represents	almost	12%	of	 the	 total	number	households	who	had	a	mortgage	in	2007.	The	over	6	million	homes	repossessed	also	caused	a	strong	brake	on	new	housing	 starts.	Around	1.5	million	new	homes	were	built	 annually	 from	1998	 to	2006.	Over	 the	years	2007-2016	 the	average	output	of	new	homes	dropped	 to	nearly	900,000,	which	accidentally	totals	up	to	6	million	less	homes	being	built	over	the	period	2007-2016	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 period	 1998-2006.	 Four	 years	 of	 new	 housing	 starts	were	 lost	 in	 the	period	2007	 to	 to-date:	 a	major	 loss	 in	 output	 and	GDP	growth.	 The	latest	available	data	show	that	in	August	2016	the	annual	new	housing	starts	on	a																																																												4	http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-foreclosure-statistics/	
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																																																																													Table	 2	 shows	 another	 fascinating	 fact.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 lowest	 interest	 rates	 on	record,	 individual	 households	were	 forced	 or	 took	 the	 initiative	 upon	 them	 to	 lower	their	outstanding	amount	of	mortgages	by	just	over	$1	trillion5.	They	did	so	from	2007,	when	mortgage	debt	as	a	percentage	of	GDP	reached	a	high	of	73.3%,	to	2015	when	this	level	 was	 brought	 back	 down	 to	 52.6%.	 Again	 this	 action	 by	 individual	 households	shows	 that	 the	 adjustment	 period	 back	 to	 a	 sound	 financial	 situation	 for	 such	households	has	taken	nearly	ten	years.	The	effect	was,	of	course,	a	subdued	growth	in	GDP.																																																																																																																																																																																																							Another	 effect	 of	 the	 overfunding	 process	 in	 home	 mortgages	 during	 1997-2006	manifested	 itself	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 average	 U.S.	 home	 sales	 price.	 As	 stated	above,	by	2007	average	house	prices	were	33%	over	the	CPI	indexed	house	prices	with	as	 base	 1997.	 From	 its	 peak	 of	 $313,600	 in	 20076,	 average	 house	 prices	 dropped	 to	$263,400	 by	 2011,	 to	 only	 gradually	 reach	 the	 2007	 level	 by	 2014.	 Again	 such	 price	adjustment	shows	just	how	long	it	took	the	markets	to	get	back	up	again;	an	adjustment	period	 of	 seven	 years.	 Overfunding	 lead	 to	 overpricing	 of	 homes,	 which	 as	 a	consequence	 led	 to	 a	 period	 of	 underfunding,	 lower	 output	 of	 new	 homes	 and	stagnation	in	prices.	The	latter	process	shows	just	how	long	the	house	funding	cycle	has	lasted:	 nearly	 twenty	 years.	 The	 interlude	 of	 mortgage-backed	 securities	 should	 not	detract	the	reader	that	the	risks	to	the	U.S.	economy	did	not	originate	from	the	funding	side	 of	mortgages	 but	 from	 the	 lending	 side.	 Overfunding	 and	 poor	 quality	mortgage	products	were	to	blame	for	the	crisis,	with	overfunding	having	by	far	the	biggest	impact.		
	
1.4.2	The	impact	on	U.S.	government	debt	levels	
	Table	 2	 did	 illustrate	 another	 main	 effect	 of	 the	 household	 mortgage	 crisis:	 the	explosion	 in	U.S.	 government	debt	 from	62.8%	of	nominal	GDP	 in	2007	 to	103.8%	 in	2015.		Table	3	will	illustrate	how	U.S.	government	revenues	held	up	as	a	percentage	of	nominal	GDP	for	the	years	2007-2015.		
	
	
	
	
																																																																																		
	
																																																									5	http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf	6	https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/uspricemon.pdf	
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Table	3:	U.S	Federal	Government	Revenues	as	compared	to	nominal	GDP	2007-2015	
	
	
Year	
	
	
2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	
Nominal	
GDP	x	
$	trillion	
	
	
14.478	
	
14.719	
	
14.419	
	
14.964	
	
15.518	
	
16.155	
	
16.692	
	
17.393	
	
18.036	
	
Fed.Govt	
Revenue	
x	
$	trillion	
	
	
	
2.57	
	
	
2.52	
	
	
2.10	
	
	
2.16	
	
	
2.30	
	
	
2.45	
	
	
2.775	
	
	
3.021	
	
	
3.250	
	
Revenue	
As	%	
Nominal	
GDP	
	
	
	
	
17.57%	
	
	
17.12%	
	
	
14.56%	
	
	
14.43%	
	
	
14.82%	
	
	
15.17%	
	
	
16.62%	
	
	
17.37%	
	
	
18.02%	
	
																																																																															In	 1997	 the	 percentage	 of	 Federal	 Government	 revenues	 out	 the	 nominal	 GDP	 was	18.35%.	When	losses	occur	both	through	increased	unemployment	levels	and	through	company,	 bank	 and	 other	 institutions	 losses,	 the	 Federal	 Government	 will,	 like	 all	governments,	 see	 their	 revenues	 flows	reduced.	Table	3	 illustrates	 this	 fact	very	well,	especially	for	the	period	2009-2012.		If	 the	 Federal	Government	 revenues	 had	been	maintained	 at	 18.35%	of	 nominal	GDP	throughout	 2007-2015,	 it	 would	 have	 brought	 the	 total	 revenue	 level	 just	 about	 $3	trillion	higher	than	was	experienced.	Over	the	same	period	the	U.S.	Federal	Government	decided	to	follow	the	Keynesian	method	of	pumping	more	money	into	the	economy	to	the	extent	of	some	$	7	trillion.	The	combined	figures	of	around	$	10	trillion	constitute	the	 increase	 in	U.S.	 Federal	Government	debt	 levels	 from	Q1	2007	 to	Q4	2015.	 If	 one	studies	the	nominal	growth	in	GDP	from	2010-2015,	one	can	safely	say	that	more	than	90%	of	 the	 growth	 in	GDP	originated	 from	 the	U.S.	 government	 reducing	 its	 tax	 take	from	society	($3	trillion)	and	increasing	its	spending	programs	($7trillion).		
	
1.4.3	The	impact	on	employment	levels	and	home	ownership	Only	after	 it	became	clear	to	employers	that	serious	economic	trouble	was	on	the	way,	did	they	reduce	recruiting	and	started	to	lay	off	workers.	This	happened	from	May	2008	when	the	unemployment	rate	increased	from	5.0%	in	April	20087	to	5.4%	in	May.	By																																																											7	http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000	
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																																																																																																																				The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		December	2008	the	rate	had	further	risen	to	7.3%.	By	December	2009	it	had	accelerated	to	9.9%,	after	it	peaked	in	October	2009	at	10%.	In	2010	a	slow	recovery	started	and	the	unemployment	 rate	 dropped	 during	 the	 year	 to	 9.3%,	 followed	 its	 drop	 to	 8.5%	 by	December	 2011,	 to	 7.9%	 in	 December	 2012,	 to	 6.7%	 in	 December	 2013,	 to	 5.6%	 in	December	2014	and	5.0%	in	December	2015.										What	is	remarkable	in	this	pattern	is	the	speed	of	the	unemployment	increase.	From	5%	in	April	2008	to	10%	in	October	2009	and	the	slow	return	back	down	to	5%	for	the	first	time	in	October	2015.	It	took	18	months	to	move	from	a	5%	unemployment	rate	in	April	2008	to	10%	by	October	2009	but	it	took	72	months	to	get	the	unemployment	rate	back	down	to	5%	by	October	2015.		 Another	coincidence	worth	mentioning	is	the	changes	in	the	labor	force					participation	rate8.	The	latter	is	defined	as	the	percentage	of	individuals	of	16	years	and	over	out	of	the	total	population	to	actively	be	in	a	job	or	be	looking	for	one.	By	May	2008	this	rate	was	66.1%	of	 the	U.S.	population.	By	October	2009	 it	had	already	dropped	to	65.0%	before	sliding	to	its	lowest	level	of	62.4%	in	September	2015.	In	July	2016	the	level	was	slightly	higher	 at	 62.8%.	 Usually	 a	 lower	 participation	 rate	 is	 the	 consequence	 of	 a	disillusionment	 borne	 by	 a	 large	 group	 of	 individuals	 in	 their	 job	 search	 leading	 to	 a	cessation	 of	 job	 seeking	 altogether.	 It	 can	 have	 structural	 reasons,	 like	 retiring	 baby	boomers,	a	decline	in	workingwomen	and	a	higher	attendance	rate	at	colleges.	Whatever	the	 causes	may	 have	 been,	 the	 slow	process	 of	 getting	 back	 to	 the	 5%	unemployment	rate	 plus	 the	 persistent	 decrease	 in	 the	 labor	 force	 participation	 rate	 implies	 that	 the	recovery	in	the	combined	income	levels	of	all	income	earners	took	at	least	6	years.	This	is	before	the	drop	in	household	real	median	income	is	taken	into	account.			 Combined	 incomes	were	not	only	under	pressure	 from	 the	 foreclosure	 filings,	but	also	from	 the	 loss	 of	 jobs	 and	 the	 lowering	 of	 the	 labor	 force	 participation	 rate.	 All	 this	explains	 why	 an	 aggressive	 mortgage-lending	 boom	 is	 particularly	 destructive	 to	working	class	households	and	thereby	to	an	economy	as	a	whole.		
																					Home	ownership 	
 
       The Census Bureau publishes quarterly data on the level of home ownership in the U.S. The 
data over the second quarter of 2016 show that the level of owner-occupier home ownership 
has dropped to 62.9% at the end of this quarter. This level is the lowest level of owner-
occupier home ownership since 1965. Graph 1 shows the developments in home ownership 
levels over the last 50 years.	
																																																																																						
	
	
	
	
	
	 																																																								8	http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11300000	
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		 Graph	1	clearly	demonstrates	that	there	have	been	two	distinct	long-term	cycles	in	home	ownership	 over	 the	 period	 1965-2016.	 The	 first	 cycle	 started	 in	 1965	 and	 lasted	 for	some	30	years	till	about	1994,	while	the	second	one	started	in	1995,	reached	its	peak	in	2004	at	69%,	stayed	close	to	this	top	for	another	two	years	to	2006	and	subsequently	set	in	its	strong	decline	continuing	to	the	second	quarter	of	2016,	when	it	reached	62.9%;	its	lowest	level	for	over	50	years.				The	 6.145	million	 repossessed	 homes	 played	 a	 role	 in	 lowering	 the	 home	 ownership	percentage.	If	these	homes	had	not	been	repossessed,	the	home	ownership	level	by	the	second	quarter	of	2016	would	have	been	at	the	higher	level	of	67.46%.		 	The	aim	of	 this	 this	paper	 is	not	 to	 try	 to	work	out	whether	a	 lower	or	higher	 level	of	home	 ownership	 is	 preferable	 for	 U.S.	 households,	 but	 rather	 whether	 the	 mortgage	credit	expansion	and	subsequent	contraction	over	the	period	1998-2016	has	something	to	do	with	 the	 substantial	 changes	 in	 the	 level	of	homeownership	 in	 the	U.S.	 and	what	lessons	can	be	learned	as	a	result	of	the	patterns	observed	and	the	drivers	for	them.		
	
2.	Economic	policy	options	
	
2.1	Why	did	the	policy	instruments	that	were	used	work	so	poorly?	
	One	 has	 to	 consider	 what	 incurring	 a	 debt	 position	 really	 means.	 For	 individual	households	 it	extends	their	scope	of	acquiring	goods	and	services.	 Incurring	 long-	 term	debt	for	acquiring	a	home	is	for	nearly	all	households	the	most	important	debt	obligation	ever	entered	into.	No	individual	household	can	be	blamed	for	taking	out	a	mortgage	loan	while	simultaneously	forgetting	to	consider	the	wider	implications	on	the	total	level	of																																																											9	http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/home-ownership-rate	
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																																																																																																																					The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning																																																																					mortgages	taken	up	in	a	particular	year.	The	Fed	in	raising	interest	rates	can	and	should	not	blame	individual	households	in	not	fully	being	able	to	foresee	such	actions.		If	households	are	no	experts	 in	 foreseeing	 interest	rate	movements,	banks	generally	do	not	have	it	within	their	powers	to	manage	the	total	volume	of	new	mortgage	lending	in	any	year	in	the	U.S.		In	his	book:	 “	The	Courage	 to	Act”10	Dr.	Ben	Bernanke	 states	 that	 the	Board	of	 the	Fed	considered	monetary	 policy	 not	 to	 be	 the	 right	 tool	 for	 addressing	 a	 possible	 housing	bubble.	With	substantial	foreign	capital	flows	coming	into	the	U.S.,	the	use	of	the	interest	rate	 tool	 was	 thought	 to	 be	 inappropriate	 for	 fighting	 asset	 bubbles.	 He	 continues:	“Unfortunately	regulatory	and	supervisory	tools	were	not	used	effectively,	either	by	the	Fed	 or	 by	 other	 financial	 regulators”.	 “Another	 problem	 was	 the	 lack	 of	 coordination	between	the	various	regulatory	authorities.”		One	 can	make	a	 few	observations	about	 the	opinions	expressed.	Table	2	 clearly	 shows	that	 the	 core	 of	 the	 problem	was	 the	 rapid	 growth	 in	 the	 volume	 of	 lending	 for	 home	mortgages,	outstripping	 the	growth	 in	nominal	GDP	by	a	 large	margin.	Lending	growth	for	home	mortgages	was	a	U.S.	based	activity,	whereby	both	lenders	and	borrowers	were	U.S.	based.	It	was	the	lending	speed	that	was	the	cause	of	the	housing	crisis,	not	the	way	it	was	funded,	either	from	domestic	sources	or	from	abroad.		Secondly	the	“asset	price	bubble”	was	the	result	of	a	lending	boom,	not	the	origin	of	it.	If	the	 lending	boom	had	been	constrained,	U.S.	house	prices	would	have	moved	up	much	more	slowly	and	the	speculation	effect	would	also	have	been	dampened.		Thirdly	the	lending	boom	was	considered	a	private	matter	for	banks.	As	long	as	the	banks	were	kept	in	a	healthy	state,	i.e.	could	absorb	the	losses	made	on	mortgage	loans,	then	the	risks	were	supposed	 to	be	manageable.	 	Of	 course,	what	banks	did	was	 to	offload	such	risks	 to	 mortgage	 backed	 security	 buyers.	 A	 risk	 transfer	 system,	 which	 created	 the	additional	risk	of	daily	liquidity	calls.		What	 was	 totally	 overlooked,	 were	 the	 risks	 to	 the	 income	 levels	 of	 individual	households.	 The	 question	 to	 answer	 should	 have	 been:	 at	 which	 point	 did	mortgage	debt	became	too	heavy	a	burden	for	incomes	to	cope	with?	In	the	U.S.,	but	also	in	other	countries,	it	is	unclear	which	unit	of	government	stands	up	for	individual	households	if	they	collectively	get	into	financial	problems,	especially	if	such	problems	originate	from	uncontrolled	and	excessive	mortgage	lending	volumes?		
2.2	Fed	funds	rate	
	The	Fed	did	not	regard	monetary	policy	the	right	tool	to	restrain	mortgage	lending	as	Dr.	Bernanke	indicated	in	his	book.		However	one	should	not	underestimate	the	effect	of	the	interest	rate	policy	on	the	mortgage	volume	over	the	period	2001-2006.																																																												10	http://couragetoactbook.com	
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																																																																																																																						The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning																																																																					In	2001	the	Fed	lowered	its	Fed	Funds	rate	from	nearly	6%	to	1.8%.	In	2002	and	2003	it	lowered	these	rates	even	further	to	just	below	1%	by	the	end	of	2003.	The	total	mortgage	debt	as	a	percentage	of	nominal	GDP	rose	by	1	percentage	point	 in	1998	over	1997,	by	1.3	percentage	points	in	1999,	by	0.9	percentage	point	in	2000,	to	jump	by	3.3	percentage	points	 in	 2001,	 4.8	 percentage	 points	 in	 2002,	 by	 5.1	 percentage	 point	 in	 2003	 and	another	 4	 and	 4.1	 percentage	 points	 in	 respectively	 2004	 and	 2005.	 In	 2005	 the	 Fed	increased	the	Fed	funds	rate	to	end	the	year	at	4.16%.	In	2006	this	move	slowed	down	the	 growth	 rate	 in	 mortgage	 lending	 somewhat,	 albeit	 to	 reach	 the	 very	 high	 level	 of	71.5%	of	the	nominal	GDP	level.		The	 foreclosure	 filings	 tell	 the	 full	 story	of	how	households	were	able	 to	cope	with	 the	extreme	 levels	 of	mortgage	 lending.	 In	 2004	 there	were	 640,000	 foreclosure	 filings,	 in	2005	802,000	and	by	2006	there	were	1.215,000	filings;	nearly	double	the	2004	level.	And	this	was	just	the	beginning	of	mass	filings.		One	can	safely	 say	 that	 the	 low	 interest	 rate	environment	 from	2001-2005,	which	may	have	been	agreed	upon	for	reasons	other	than	the	home	mortgage	market	developments,	certainly	 seems	 to	 have	 encouraged	 an	 accelerated	 growth	 in	 home	mortgage	 lending,	rather	 than	 restraining	 the	 volume	 of	 new	 mortgages.	 As	 Dr.	 Bernanke	 admits	 in	 his	book:	regulatory	and	supervisory	tools	were	not	used	effectively.		What	 is	 remarkable	 is	 that	 low	 interest	 rates	 may	 have	 been	 an	 influential	 factor	 in	stimulating	 the	 mortgage	 market	 over	 the	 period	 2001-2006,	 but	 that	 the	 same	 low	interest	 rates	 over	 the	 period	 2008-2015	 had	 a	 totally	 different	 effect.	 Over	 the	 latter	years	the	mortgagors	paid	back	a	net	$1	trillion	and	reduced	the	total	mortgage	debt	as	a	percentage	of	nominal	GDP	from	73.3%	in	2007	to	52.6%	by	2015.																																																																																																																																		The	 reason	 for	 this	development	 is	quite	 simple.	 Individual	households	were	 forced	or	took	it	upon	themselves	to	reduce	their	mortgage	borrowing	levels.	The	appreciation	of	house	prices	had	gone	with	the	over	6	million	repossessed	homes	coming	on	the	market.	On	 top	of	 this,	 the	pressure	by	 lenders	 to	 repay	outstanding	mortgages	had	 intensified	immensely.	 No	 low	 interest	 rate	 level	 could	 either	 entice	 more	 borrowers	 or	 induce	lenders.		The	 forced	 reduction	 in	 debt,	 the	 strongly	 increased	 level	 of	 unemployment	 and	 the	reduced	labor	force	participation	rate	all	added	up	to	a	lower	level	of	disposable	income	for	individual	households;	a	situation	which	only	slowly	improved	between	2008	and	to	date.		
	
2.3	Quantitative	easing	
	The	Federal	Reserve	decided	to	acquire	both	U.S.	Treasuries	as	well	as	mortgage	backed	securities.	Over	several	tranches	$2.5	trillion	in	Treasuries	and	$1.7	trillion	in	mortgage	backed	securities	were	acquired.	These	bonds	are	still	on	the	balance	sheet	of	the	Federal	Reserve	as	of	the	end	of	October	2016.		
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																																																																																																																			The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning			Just	 using	 two	 data	 can	 show	 the	 effects	 of	 quantitative	 easing	 on	 the	 yield	 of	 U.S.	treasuries:	on	12th	June	2007	the	10-year	yield	was	5.26%.	Precisely	nine	years	later	on	the	 13th	 of	 June	 2016	 -after	 the	U.S.	 government	 debt	 had	 doubled	 between	 2007	 and	2016-	the	10-year	yield	had	dropped	to	1.62%.		The	act	of	buying	U.S.	Treasuries	did	lower	long-term	rates	dramatically;	but	did	it	help	individual	households	to	service	their	mortgage	debt	obligations?	The	same	question	can	be	asked	about	the	acquisition	of	mortgage-backed	securities.	In	both	cases	the	winners	were	 the	 owners	 of	 such	Treasuries	 and	mortgage	bondholders	 and	not	 the	 individual	households	who	had	a	mortgage.	The	lenders	won,	the	borrowers	lost	out.		Quantitative	easing	has	had	a	number	of	 serious	side	effects:	Pension	 funds	make	poor	returns	 and	are	often	 forced	 to	 cut	 the	payout	 to	 their	pensioners.	 Companies	 running	defined	benefit	pension	schemes	are	 forced	 to	allocate	a	 larger	share	of	 their	profits	 to	filling	 the	black	hole	 that	 is	 the	 actuarial	 deficit	 run	up	by	 these	pension	 funds.	 In	 this	manner	 company	 profits	 are	 not	 used	 for	 investment	 purposes	 to	 grow	 the	 business.	When	interest	rates	will	start	to	rise,	holders	of	such	securities	–including	pension	funds,	insurance	 companies,	 banks	 and	 central	 banks-	will	 sit	 on	 substantial	mark	 to	market	losses.	Maintaining	low	interest	rates	is	also	not	an	option	as	savers	will	have	to	put	more	money	in	their	defined	contribution	schemes	to	ensure	that	they	might	have	a	reasonable	pension	payment	in	old	age.	Buying	up	corporate	bonds	is	fraught	with	danger	as	it	gives	preferential	treatment	to	some	companies	over	other	ones.	Why	should	large	companies	be	 helped	 over	 small	 and	 median	 sized	 ones,	 as	 the	 latter	 are	 the	 main	 creators	 of	employment	opportunities?		The	main	mistake	about	QE	was	that	 it	did	help	the	 lenders	and	owners	of	bonds,	but	did	 nothing	 to	 soften	 the	 blow	 to	 individual	 households	 that	 got	 into	 financial	difficulties	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 overfunding	 and	 thereby	 overpricing	 of	 homes	 as	 was	shown	 in	 table	2	 and	 above	 text.	QE	was	 an	 afterthought	 after	 the	 lending	horse	had	bolted.	During	 2003-2006	 the	 courage	 to	 act	was	 not	 there	 to	 prevent	 the	mortgage-lending	boom	taking	place.		In	 a	 recent	 study	 by	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 quantitative	 easing,	 it	concluded	 that	 it	 had	 a	material	 impact	 on	 financial	markets,	 generating	 a	 significant	loosening	 in	 credit	 conditions	 and	 it	 served	 to	 boost	 temporarily	 output	 and	 prices.	Although	growth	and	inflation	have	not	taken	off	dramatically,	the	research	found	that	QE	 did	 boost	 corporate	 borrowing,	 reducing	 costs	 for	 companies	 and	 encouraging	investments,	and	thus	the	economy.		This	may	all	be	true,	but	as	the	case	of	the	U.S.	demonstrates,	the	consumer	demand	side	was	severely	affected	by	the	excessive	mortgage-lending	boom	and	subsequent	reversal	of	 this	 process	 from	 2008	 and	 later	 years.	 To	 help	 supply	 grow	 seems	 somehow	irrelevant	when	major	debt	factors	restrain	individual	households	in	their	consumption	level.		
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3	The	losses	to	American	society		
3.1	The	losses	to	individual	households	
	Individual	 households	were	 and	 have	 been	 the	main	 losers	 in	 the	 adjustment	 process.	They	 lost	over	8	million	 jobs	between	April	2008	and	October	2009.	 It	 took	 from	April	2008	 to	 October	 2015	 to	 reach	 the	 5%	 unemployment	 rate	 again.	 23.250	 million	households	were	confronted	with	foreclosure	proceedings	or	45%	of	all	households	with	a	mortgage.	 All	 these	 households	 had	 to	 prioritize	 debt	 servicing	 out	 of	 their	 incomes	over	 consumer	 spending.	 Individual	 households	 lost	 6.145	 million	 homes	 due	 to	repossession	 over	 the	 period	 2006-2014.	 The	 real	 median	 household	 income	 was	$57,423	 in	 2007	 and	 up	 to	 date	 this	 level	 has	 not	 been	 exceeded	 yet.	 In	 other	 words	household	 incomes	 have	 dropped	 in	 real	 terms.	 The	 labor	 force	 participation	 rate	 has	dropped	from	66.1%	in	May	2008	to	62.8%	by	July	2016.		Individual	 households	 lost	 jobs,	 homes,	 incomes	 and	 to	 some	 extent	 the	 chance	 to	participate	 in	 the	 labor	 force.	This	happened	all	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	unchecked	excessive	mortgage-lending	 pattern	 that	 took	 place	 from	2002-2007.	 If	 this	was	 not	 enough,	 the	consequences	of	the	deterioration	in	individual	households’	financial	position	led	to	even	greater	losses	for	the	U.S.	government.			
	
3.2	The	losses	to	the	whole	population	of	the	United	States	
	When	 individual	 households	 lose	 jobs,	 incomes	 and	 homes,	 the	 performance	 of	companies	 and	 the	 financial	 sector	 also	 take	 a	 battering.	 Company	 losses	 are	 made.	According	to	tax	rules	in	the	U.S.	as	in	many	other	countries,	such	company	losses	can	be	offset	 against	 profits	 in	 subsequent	 years.	 Table	 3	 shows	 the	 effects	 of	 such	 losses	 on	Federal	 Government	 revenues.	 The	 size	 of	 this	 loss	 over	 the	 period	 2008-2015	 was	calculated	as	adding	up	to	$3	trillion.	In	other	words	the	financial	crisis	caused	a	loss	to	the	whole	U.S.	population	of	$3	trillion.	In	2015	there	were	124.6	million	households	in	the	U.S.,	therefore	the	loss	was	$24,077	for	each	household.		As	a	result	of	the	financial	crisis	not	only	did	individual	households	lose	jobs,	income	and	over	6	million	homes,	they	each	were	faced	with	an	additional	debt	of	over	$24,000	to	be	paid	off	out	of	future	income.															It	did	not	stop	there.	The	U.S.	government	in	its	desire	to	get	the	economy	back	on	track	subsequently	spent	an	extra	$7	trillion	on	economic	stimulus	measures	over	the	period	2009-2015.	This	fact	adds	another	$56,180	to	the	debt	per	household.	The	financial	crisis	increased	government	debt	per	household	by	over	$80,000!		One	may	have	to	consider	whether	such	tax	loss	absorption	reflects	a	fair	distribution	of	incomes	between	 companies	 and	 individual	 households.	 Fair	 taxation	 rules	would	 give	individual	households	the	same	rights	as	companies	to	offset	losses	against	future																																																																																																																																				
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																																																																																																																																	The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		incomes.	 However,	 this	 would	 leave	 the	 U.S.	 government	 seriously	 out	 of	 money	 and	would	probably	not	be	very	practical.			The	monetary	policies	pursued	(lowest	interest	rates	on	record	and	quantitative	easing)	led	to	 further	 losses	 in	 income	for	companies	with	DB	pension	schemes,	 for	 individuals	within	DC	pension	arrangements,	for	life	insurance	companies	with	guaranteed	payouts	on	annuity	contracts	and	for	all	 institutions	holding	government	bonds	when	long-term	interest	rates	start	to	rise.	The	size	of	such	losses	are	not	so	easily	quantifiable,	but	the	very	fact	that	the	IMF	warns	for	large	scale	insolvencies	for	these	pension	funds	and	life	insurance	 companies	 if	 current	 low	 rates	 are	 maintained,	 is	 sufficient	 to	 take	 these	threats	seriously.		For	the	U.S.	economy	the	economic	focus	need	a	shift	towards	loss	avoidance	and	in	case	losses	were	not	avoided	a	loss	prevention	strategy.		The	 best	 option	 would	 have	 been	 to	 prevent	 the	 financial	 crisis	 occurring	 in	 the	 first	place,	 however	 this	 was	 not	 done.	 The	 second	 best	 option	 would	 have	 been	 to	 help	individual	households	in	meeting	their	financial	obligations,	with	conditions	attached.	In	the	next	section	proposals	of	how	this	could	have	been	done	have	been	set	out.		What	should	be	clear	from	above	losses	is	that	individual	households	have	been	the	clear	losers	 both	 individually	 and	 collectively.	 Macro-economic	 debt	 management	arrangements	for	them	have	failed	to	the	detriment	of	all	households.		
4	Some	conclusions	and	recommendations	
	The	main	conclusion	that	can	be	drawn	from	the	events	explained	in	this	paper	is	that	it	does	 not	make	 economic	 sense	 to	 let	 individual	 households	 drown	 in	mortgage	 debt,	only	 to	 see	 the	 economy	 create	much	 bigger	 losses	 in	 order	 to	 get	 economic	 growth	back	on	track.																																																																																																																														The	focus	on	economic	growth	rather	than	on	debt	management	has	 led	to	the	wrong	policy	applications	 in	order	 to	 try	 to	get	 the	U.S.	 economy	growing	again.	 Initially	 the	unfettered	 growth	 in	 mortgage	 lending,	 especially	 from	 2003-2007,	 which	 was	 left	unchallenged,	 caused	 households	 to	 be	 exposed	 to	 a	 debt	 level	 that	 they	 could	 not	service	 any	 longer.	 	 The	 policy	 responses	 from	 2008	 onwards,	 setting	 the	 lowest	interest	rates	on	record	and	the	use	of	quantitative	easing	did	not	address	the	existing	debt	management	 issues	 for	 individual	 households.	 The	 system	 of	 letting	 a	 privately	owned	 banking	 system	 sort	 out	 such	 debt	 management	 situation	 did	 exacerbate	 the	problem,	 rather	 than	 solving	 it	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 the	 whole	 nation.	 The	 losses	created	 by	 such	 faulty	 economic	 solutions	 did	 cost	 the	 U.S.	 (and	 also	 other	 nations	following	 the	U.S.	 lead)	 far	more	 than	 any	 adjustment	 to	 the	 cash	 flows	 of	 individual	households	would	have	costs.	The	period	after	2008	has	been	one	of	a	slow	economic	growth	 pattern,	 a	 huge	 increase	 in	 U.S	 government	 debt,	 extremely	 poor	 returns	 for	savers,	including	for	the	many	who	try	to	build	up	a	decent	pension	pot	and	finally	real	wage	levels	that	did	drop	since	2008.		
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																																																																																																																									The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		For	the	U.S.	economy	the	economic	focus	need	a	shift	towards	loss	avoidance	and	in	case	losses	were	not	avoided	a	 loss	prevention	strategy.	This	 focus	 is	a	 focus	on	particularly	individual	households.	They	suffer	the	prime	losses	in	case	of	excessive	mortgage	lending	growth	levels.		Their	losses	cause	companies	and	after	that	the	government	to	start	losing	incomes.		
Institutional	set	up	
	The	question	needs	to	be	raised	whether	the	Fed	was	the	logical	U.S.	entity	to	deal	with	the	individual	household	mortgage	debt	crisis.	Of	course	it	is	logical	that,	over	the	period	1997-2007,	 the	 Fed	 in	 its	 role	 as	 main	 U.S.	 banking	 supervisor	 could	 have	 acted	 to	restrain	banks	 in	 their	home	mortgages’	 lending	 volumes.	However,	 during	 this	period	banking	 supervision	was	 a	 fragmented	 activity	 between	 the	 twelve	 individual	 Reserve	Banks,	 the	Office	of	 the	Controller	of	Currency	 for	banks	 chartered	at	 the	 federal	 level,	State-banking	supervisors	for	banks	with	a	state	charter,	 the	Federal	Deposit	 Insurance	Corporation	 examining	 some	 state	 chartered	 banks,	 the	 Office	 of	 Thrift	 Supervision	regulating	 savings	 institutions	 and	 the	 National	 Credit	 Union	 Association	 overseeing	credit	 unions.	 With	 this	 fragmentation,	 enforcing	 volume	 control	 measures	 over	 a	mortgage-lending	boom	became	an	institutional	nightmare.	It	did	not	happen.		A	second	question	could	be:	For	the	period	2008-2016	was	the	Fed	the	logical	entity	to	deal	 with	 the	 liquidity	 crisis	 of	 over	 23	 million	 individual	 households?	 The	 obvious	answer	 is	 negative.	 Banking	 supervision,	 inflation	 management,	 combatting	unemployment	 levels,	 liquidity	 management	 for	 the	 banking	 system	 are	 all	 tasks	entrusted	to	the	Fed,	but	solving	individual	households’	liquidity	problems	is	not	one	of	them	and	logically	speaking	neither	should	it	be.			Over	the	same	period,	the	second	issue	concerned	the	banking	sector	and	the	mortgage	bondholders.	 The	 problem	 was,	 and	 still	 is,	 that	 lenders,	 be	 they	 banks	 or	 mortgage	backed	securities	holders,	require	households	to	pay	on	time	and	in	agreed	amounts	to	service	their	mortgage	debt.	For	banks	it	affects	their	profit	levels	if	their	borrowers	do	not	 repay	 in	 line	with	 the	agreed	 contracts.	 For	mortgage	bondholders,	whom	have	no	direct	relationship	with	individual	households,	late	or	no	payments	caused	an	immediate	loss	in	bond	values.			Banks’	drive	for	short-term	profits	and	the	value	orientation	from	mortgage	bondholders	do	 not	 square	 easily	 with	 the	 subsequent	 losses	 to	 households,	 the	 government	 and	ultimately	 to	 the	 whole	 economy	 in	 lost	 growth	 periods.	 Over	 the	 period	 1997-2007	banks	 benefitted	 excessively	 from	 the	 mortgage-lending	 boom.	 During	 the	 current	adjustment	period	for	individual	households,	which	lasted	from	2008	to	this	year,	banks	and	bondholders	were	the	least	likely	to	work	for	the	common	goal	of	economic	growth.		The	 short-term	 interest	 of	 each	 bank	 or	 bondholder	 in	 managing	 profits	 or	 values	motivates	 banks	 to	 call	 their	 loans	 as	 soon	 as	 they	 become	 overdue.	 The	 longer-term	repercussions	on	the	economy	are	not	taken	into	account	as	they	are	in	conflict	with	the	short-term	 profit/value	 objectives	 of	 banks	 and	 bondholders.	 	 A	 new	 system	 of	 risk	sharing	is	needed	to	avoid	economic	downturns.		
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Risk	sharing	
	In	 the	 U.S	 case,	 prevention	 of	 the	 mortgage	 debt	 crisis	 was	 not	 undertaken.	 A	 loss	prevention	 strategy	 could	 have	 worked,	 as	 will	 be	 set	 out	 later,	 but	 a	 loss	 avoidance	strategy	is	also	needed.		In	 order	 to	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	 increased	 levels	 of	 insolvency	 among	 individual	households	 in	 relation	 to	 mortgage	 debt	 in	 times	 of	 economic	 distress,	 a	 risk	 partner	needs	 to	 be	 introduced.	 Households	 would	 benefit	 greatly	 from	 a	 temporary	 boost	 in	their	liquidity	to	overcome	the	shortfall	in	cash.	They	need	a	form	of	recapitalization.		 	It	 is	 obvious	 that	 such	 recapitalization	 will	 not	 come	 from	 the	 lenders,	 whose	 only	objective	is	to	recoup	as	much	of	their	outstanding	loans	as	possible	and	in	the	quickest	possible	 time	period.	 For	 financial	 institutions,	 profit	 levels	 drive	 their	 actions,	 not	 the	macro-economic	impact	of	such	actions.		 The	only	solution	is	a	state	sponsored	one.	To	date,	the	state	sponsored	choice	has	been	to	 guarantee	 (implicitly	 or	 explicitly)	 the	 outstanding	mortgage	 bonds	 to	 the	 extent	 of	some	 $7	 trillion,	 which	 on	 a	 mortgage	 portfolio	 of	 $9.5	 trillion	 is	 a	 very	 sizeable	commitment.	 Of	 the	 $7	 trillion	 $1.763	 trillion	 is	 on	 the	 balance	 sheet	 of	 the	 Federal	Reserve	per	October	13th,	2016.	The	 lenders	have	been	 implicitly	guaranteed	that	 they	will	receive	their	money	back	in	due	course.		 There	 is	another,	a	cheaper	and	more	effective	solution.	To	make	an	arrangement	with	the	 borrowers,	 one	needs	 a	 state	 owned	 institution	 to	 do	 so:	A	U.S.	National	Mortgage	Bank	(NMB).	The	NMB	can	be	the	risk	partner	of	individual	households	when	needed.	It	needs	to	be	set	up	now	in	order	to	be	ready	for	the	next	recession.		
	
How	setting	up	a	National	Mortgage	Bank	may	serve	as	a	macro-economic	tool.	
	
4.1	The	creation	of	a	lender	of	last	resort	for	individual	households	
	A	National	Mortgage	Bank	 (NMB)	would	not	be	 a	mortgage	 lender	or	originator	 in	 the	normal	sense.	One	could	not	visit	 its	office	 to	obtain	a	mortgage.	 It	 is	also	not	a	Fannie	Mae	or	Freddy	Mac,	organizations	that	facilitate	long-term	fixed	rate	mortgages.	What	it	would	be,	is	an	instrument	of	economic	policy,	only	to	be	called	into	action	as	and	when	the	number	of	foreclosure	proceedings	start	to	grow	substantially.	An	NMB	would	be	the	temporary	“joint	shareholder”	 for	 those	 in	need	when	 lending	volumes	have	run	out	of	hand.	 An	 NMB	 would	 temporarily	 improve	 the	 cash	 flow	 position	 of	 working	 class	households	and	reduce	the	pressure	on	selling	homes.		 In	preparation	for	countering	the	next	recession,	the	U.S.	could	take	the	step	to	legislate	for	and	subsequently	set	up	a	National	Mortgage	Bank.			
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4.2	How	an	NMB	could	operate	
	 The	 mortgage	 crisis	 originated	 in	 the	 U.S.,	 therefore	 it	 is	 probably	 appropriate	 to	formulate	for	this	country	of	how	an	NMB	could	work:																																																																																																										
• Legal	framework:	A	law	could	be	enacted,	which	sets	out	the	operating	structure	for	 an	 NMB,	 its	 legal	 rights	 and	 obligations,	 its	 funding	 structure	 and	 its	 first	management	set	up;		
• Ownership:	Due	to	its	character	as	a	tool	of	economic	policy,	the	NMB	needs	to	be	a	100%	owned	U.S.	government	entity;		
• Start	and	closure	of	the	operating	period:	A	designated	team	from	the	U.S.	government	charged	with	economic	policy	decisions	could	instruct	the	NMB	to	start	operating.	The	basis	for	such	decision	is	a	rapid	increase	in	the	level	of	foreclosure	proceedings.	The	same	team	would	decide	when	to	close	the	operating	period	when	the	level	of	foreclosures	drops	off	rapidly;		
• Tools:	The	tools	handed	to	the	NMB	will	be	to	provide	cash	to	individual	households	confronted	with	foreclosure	proceedings.	The	quantum	of	cash	received	could	vary	from	income	class	to	income	class,	with	for	instance	the	lowest	income	class	to	receive	up	to	60%	of	monthly	payments,	the	second	group		50%,	etc.	These	payments	vary	per	mortgagor,	but	include	an	interest	and	a	principal	element.	The	duration	of	such	payments	could	be	decided	by	above	designated	team	on	basis	of	the	status	of	the	recovery.	Company	owned	or	other	buy-to-let	mortgagors	may	not	qualify.	During	the	economic	recovery	period			the	funds	provided	could	be	granted	at	0%	interest	rate.	During	the	designated	‘economic	recovery	period’	and	thereafter	a	sub-ordinated	mortgage	would	be	granted	to	the	NMB	as	security	over	the	accumulated	principal	amount	lent.	Such	sub-ordination	would	be	to	the	existing	level	of	an	outstanding	mortgage	only.	After	the	closure	of	the	economic	recovery	period	all	amounts	granted	to	households	would	increase	their	mortgage	debt	to	the	NMB.	The	NMB	could	fund	itself	with	funds	from	the	Federal	Reserve,	based	on	a	U.S.	government	guarantee.	In	the	period	after	recovery,	the	payments	could	be	gradually	lowered	to	zero,	and	the	interest	rate	of	the	loan	set	at	the	ten-year	government	bond	rate	plus	a	small	margin.	After	the	official	end	of	the	recovery	period	mortgagors	could	be	asked	to	gradually	fully	service	their	interest	payments.	The	ultimate	repayment	of	the	outstanding	principal	amount	could	take	place	as	and	when	the	borrower	wishes	and	is	alive.	Upon	death	the	full	amount	outstanding	becomes	payable;																																																																																																							
• Referral	process:	As	soon	as	banks	or	financial	institutions	declare	that	a	individual	mortgagor	has	been	informed	about	foreclosure,	the	case	should	be	transferred	to	the	NMB;		
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• Beneficiaries:	Significant	beneficiaries	of	the	risk	sharing	approach	would	be	the	lending	 banks	 and	 mortgage	 bondholders.	 The	 NMB	 should	 be	 placed	 in	 a	position	to	charge	the	fund	providers	for	the	reduced	risks	over	their	mortgage	related	portfolios.																																																																																			
4.3	Economic	benefits	of	having	an	NMB	
		There	will	be	a	number	of	core	benefits	from	having	an	NMB	in	operation.	A	first	one	is	related	 to	 the	 spending	 power	 of	 individual	 households.	 The	 cash	 injection	will	 help	mortgagors	to	fulfill	their	mortgage	obligations,	and	equally	it	enables	them	to	continue	to	 spend	 on	 other	 goods	 and	 services.	 Had	 the	 NMB	 been	 in	 place	 in	 2007,	 such	increased	 levels	of	 economic	activity	would	have	 increased	government	 tax	 revenues.	As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 NMB’s	 operation	 would	 have	 markedly	 slowed	 down	 the	 U.S.	government	 debt	 increase.	 As	 it	was:	 the	 level	 of	 Federal	 government	 debt	 increased	from	$9	trillion	in	2007	to	$19	trillion		(May	2016).		A	 second	 benefit	 is	 related	 to	 house	 prices.	 When	 the	 majority	 of	 foreclosure	proceedings	no	longer	lead	to	home	repossessions,	house	prices	will	drop	less	forcefully	and	be	more	stable.	Such	stability	will	encourage	potential	homeowners	to	come	to	the	housing	 market.	 This	 may	 also	 lead	 to	 a	 more	 stable	 level	 of	 new	 housing	 starts.	Introducing	the	NMB	system	makes	individual	households	less	reliant	on	extremely	low	interest	 rates.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 NMB	 is	 not	 to	 attract	more	 households	 to	 the	 housing	market.	Commercial	banks	do	 that.	The	NMB’s	aim	 is	 to	help	existing	homeowners	 to	fulfill	 their	 mortgage	 obligations.	 For	 these	 homeowners,	 it	 will	 turn	 a	 long-term	borrowing	position	 into	a	 temporary	 favorable	cash	 flow	position,	 independent	of	 the	current	prevailing	 interest	rate.	When	consumer	demand	 levels	 fluctuate	 less,	 there	 is	less	need	for	an	interest	rate	stimulus.																																																																																																					With	the	existence	of	an	NMB,	the	Fed’s	interest	rate	setting	policy	can	move	more	freely.		Quantitative	 easing	 injections	 are	 an	 indirect	 method	 of	 encouraging	 borrowings.	Setting	up	an	NMB	helps	households	in	need	to	fulfill	their	existing	mortgage	obligations	in	a	direct	manner,	rather	than	involve	them	in	more	private	sector	borrowings.	 It	re-aligns	 outstanding	 debt	 with	 future	 earnings	 levels.	 An	 NMB	 creates	 a	 direct	 link	between	 maintaining	 consumption	 levels	 and	 existing	 household	 debt	 levels.	 The	economy	will	become	less	dependent	on	QE	injections.		In	 a	previous	paper:	 “Why	borrowers	 rather	 than	banks	 should	have	been	 rescued”11,	the	 author	 did	 calculate	 that	 the	 total	 NMB	 lending	 level	 during	 the	 operating	 period	2006-2013	would	have	been	about	$1.2	trillion.	This	amount	consists	partly	of	the	zero	interest	 rate	 subsidy	 during	 the	 period	 classified	 as	 the	 recovery	 period;	 for	 the	remainder	 it	 covers	 principal	 amount	 payments	 as	 advanced	 by	 the	 NMB	 to	 the	borrower.	The	combined	amount	is	still	$500	billion	less	than	the	Fed	–as	a	result	of	its	quantitative	easing	operations-has	currently	in	mortgage-backed	securities	on	its	books.			 																																																								11https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68990/	
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																																																																																																																			The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		The	team	in	charge	of	setting	the	starting	and	end	date	of	the	intervention	period	could	make	proposals	to	Congress	about	the	desirable	levels	of	subsidy	and	loan	amounts	for	each	 income	 group.	 The	 key	 cash	 transfer	 element	would	 have	 been	 a	 very	welcome	rearrangement	 of	 an	 individual	 household’s	 cash	 flows.	 Improvements	 in	 short-term	liquidity	will	help	long-term	solvency	for	households.	
	
	
5.	Preventive	measures	
	 The	 fact	 that	 no	 preventive	 measures	 were	 taken	 in	 2003-2007	 to	 stem	 the	 annual	volume	 of	 the	 home	 mortgage	 production	 levels,	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 such	 measures	cannot	be	put	 in	place	 today.	The	 first	 issue	 is	 that	 the	overall	management	of	 such	a	system	should	be	entrusted	to	one	U.S.	wide	regulator,	rather	than	have	different	central	and	 state	 authorities	 each	 deciding	 for	 themselves	 what	 is	 the	 optimal	 mortgage	production	level	for	their	area.			
5.1	An	early	warning	system		 An	 ‘early	warning’	 system	 could	 be	 installed	which	 sounds	 an	 alarm	 once	 it	 becomes	clear	that	the	mortgage	allocation	for	new	homes	by	far	exceeds	the	real	market	house	prices	and	nominal	GDP	growth.	Such	a	system	could	use	 ‘traffic	 lights’	 to	warn	banks	that	caution	is	required.		Green	 would	 indicate	 that	 the	 mortgage	 markets	 are	 not	 growing	 too	 fast	 and	 may	continue	 to	 grow	until	 further	notice.	Amber	 for	when	 the	 speed	of	mortgage	 lending	growth	 is	 becoming	 excessive	 and	 signaling	 those	 lenders	 should	 slow	 down	 their	lending	 volumes	with	 red	 reserved	 for	when	mortgage	 volumes	 are	 growing	 too	 fast.	The	 Fed	 could	 indicate	 the	 rate	 at	 which	 the	mortgage	market	may	 safely	 grow.	 Any	institution	exceeding	such	speed	of	growth	might	be	penalized	as	 it	risks	undermining	the	volume	targets	needed	to	avoid	a	boom-bust	situation.		Banks	cannot	be	expected	to	stop	mortgage	lending	volumes	to	grow	voluntarily,	hence	a	simple	but	effective	 traffic	management	system	helps	 to	avoid	that	 the	U.S.	economy	will	not	return	to	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis	situation	again.		
	
5.2	Set	up	a	home	mortgage	quality	control	system	
	Banks	and	other	 financial	 institutions	are	very	adept	 in	developing	products	 that	help	their	profits	rise	in	the	short	term.	Subprime	mortgages	and	‘teaser’	rates	are	just	a	few	of	the	examples	that	come	to	mind.	Mortgage	backed	securitization	is	another	example.	There	is	nothing	wrong	with	the	principle	of	finding	investors	other	than	banks	to	fund	mortgage	portfolios.	However	 the	practice	as	executed	 in	 the	U.S.	 from	2004-2007	 left	much	to	be	desired.																																																																																				Banks	may	prefer	their	freedom	of	the	markets,	but	market	freedoms	should	not	come	with	a	price	tag	for	society	as	a	whole,	which	is	at	odds	with	the	benefit	of	the		
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																																																																																																																						The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		entrepreneurial	freedoms	acquired.	For	instance	it	cannot	be	right	that	over	the	period	2006-2013	 as	 a	 result	 of	 bad	 bank	 practices	 21.3	 million	 U.S.	 households	 were	confronted	with	foreclosure	proceedings	or	nearly	45%	of	all	mortgagors.	It	can	also	not	be	right	that	1	out	of	every	8	households	with	a	mortgage	lost	their	home	over	the	same	period.	 It	 cannot	 be	 right	 that	 7.8	 million	 workers	 lost	 their	 jobs	 between	 2008	 and	201012	as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Finally	 it	 cannot	 be	 right	 that	 as	 a	consequence	of	the	financial	crisis	U.S.	government	debt	more	than	doubled	from	$9.22	trillion	by	the	end	of	2007	to	$18.922	trillion	by	the	end	of	201513.		For	 these	 reasons	 a	 mortgage	 quality	 control	 system	 could	 be	 put	 in	 place.	 In	 1994	Congress	with	the	support	of	the	Fed	passed	the	Home	Ownership	and	Equity	Protection	Act	 (HOEPA),	 to	 outlaw	 abusive	 mortgage	 lending	 practices.	 However	 this	 Act	concentrated	on	predatory	lending	practices	and	it	did	not	intend	to	impede	‘legitimate’	access	 to	 the	 subprime	 mortgage	 markets.	 When	 the	 Act	 was	 drafted	 no	 one	 had	foreseen	the	volume-lending	boom	of	the	early	2000s.	Furthermore	implementation	of	the	 Act	 was	 not	 helped	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 implementation	 was	 executed	 by	 many	regulatory	bodies,	without	anyone	of	them	having	full	management	control.			A	major	flaw	of	the	Act	is	that	it	dealt	only	with	individual	household	cases	and	not	with	the	macro	economic	impact	of	a	mortgage	lending	boom	supported	by	banking	practices	often	no	longer	based	on	the	ability	of	households	to	repay	outstanding	mortgages	out	of	current	 income,	 but	 out	 of	 future	 expected	 values	 of	 the	 home	 being	 financed.	 The	‘crime’,	which	 the	 Act	 failed	 to	 cover,	 is	 an	 ‘economic	 crime’,	 committed	 by	wantonly	placing	 customers	 in	 a	 ‘loss’	 situation	 when	 it	 was	 known	 or	 could	 be	 expected	 that	house	prices	were	no	longer	rising.	
	
																																																																														
	
5.3	Marry	the	early	warning	system	with	the	quality	control	one	
	Mortgage	lending	was	at	the	amber	level	in	2002-2003.	The	policy	measures	needed	at	that	point	would	have	been	 twofold:	 to	 introduce	a	product	 liability	 system	 for	banks	and	introduce	a	macro-economic	reserve	policy	(MERP).		Most	 companies,	when	 they	 sell	 a	 product,	 provide	 a	 guarantee	 that	 the	 product	will	operate	satisfactorily	during	the	lifetime	of	the	product.	Banks	cannot	guarantee	that	the	home	mortgage	client	will	not	default	on	home	mortgage	payments.	However	the	amber	stage	in	home	mortgage	lending	indicates	that	the	net	volume	growth	in	new	lending	is	reaching	 a	 dangerous	 pitch.	 The	 Fed	 and	 with	 it	 all	 other	 bank	 and	 financial	 sector	regulators	could	stipulate	that	any	new	home	mortgage	requires	a	financial	reserve	set	aside	 within	 the	 originating	 institution	 at	 a	 higher	 level	 than	 the	 previous	 one.	 For	instance,																																																												12	http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/203740.pdf	13	http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/search?startMonth=12&startDay=31&startYear=2007&endMonth=12&endDay=31&endYear=2015	
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																																																																																																														The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning																																																																																																																									If	3%	was	the	expectation	of	the	annual	level	of	doubtful	debtors	before	the	amber	stage,	the	Fed	could	dictate	that	5%	is	added	to	the	reserves	for	any	new	home	mortgage.	The	second	stipulation	could	be	that	such	reserves	have	to	be	kept	 in	place	until	 the	home	mortgage	has	been	fully	repaid.	Selling	the	funding	side	of	the	mortgage	to	third	parties	should	not	be	a	factor	in	releasing	such	reserves.	They	should	stay	in	place	until	the	end	of	the	mortgage	period.		The	‘red’	stage	requires	a	more	drastic	approach,	as	this	stage	reflects	the	fact	that	the	macro-economic	development	of	the	relevant	country	is	at	serious	risk.	This	happened	during	 2004-2006	 in	 the	 U.S.	 	 A	 material	 macro-economic	 risk	 necessitates	 a	 quite	different	counter-measure.			Jobs	are	at	risks.	8	million	people	lost	their	jobs	as	a	consequence	of	the	financial	crisis.	Government	 funding	 is	 at	 risk	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 doubling	 of	 government	 debt	from	$9	trillion	to	nearly	$19	trillion	over	the	period	2007-2015.	The	financial	stability	of	 25	million	 households	was	 at	 risk	 as	 foreclosure	 proceedings	were	 started	 against	them.	Building	 enough	new	homes	was	put	 at	 risk.	 If	 annually	1.5	million	new	homes	were	needed,	the	cumulative	shortfall	over	the	period	2008-2015	reached	6	million.		The	macro-economic	risks	caused	by	an	excessive	speed	of	lending	put	not	only	banks	at	risk,	 but	 also	 jobs,	 incomes,	 pension	 savings,	 government	 expenditure,	 home	 building	and	of	course	companies	due	to	a	reduced	demand	for	goods	and	services.		A	well	considered	response	would	be	to	ensure	that	at	 the	red	stage	the	new	reserves	built	up	for	doubtful	debtors	on	home	mortgages	are	available	not	just	to	the	banks	and	their	shareholders,	but	to	the	population	at	large:	from	Wall	Street	to	Main	Street.	Such	a	MERP	would	consist	of	two	elements:	firstly,	it	would	increase	the	reserve	ratio	to	some	8%	 for	 all	 new	 home	mortgage	 lending	 and	 secondly,	 the	 reserves	 should	 be	 placed	away	from	the	lender	and	at	the	Fed	in	the	form	of	U.S.	government	securities.	It	could	be	decided	that	such	reserves	have	to	stay	at	the	Fed	until	the	mortgage	loans	have	been	repaid.	Furthermore	as	the	threat	is	one	to	the	macro-economy	of	the	U.S.,	such	reserves		should	be	pledged	to	the	Fed	and	the	U.S.	government	 in	case	of	bank	failure.	 In	effect	the	 transfer	 of	 reserves	 to	 the	 Fed	 would	 constitute	 a	 provisional	 penalty	 for	 the	financial	 institution	 involved	 in	 order	 to	 get	 the	micro	 and	 the	macro	 policies	 in	 line.	Rather	 than	 issuing	 penalties	 after	 the	 recession	 period	 as	 is	 being	 done	 currently,	 a	preventive	method	would	be	the	up-front	transfer	of	reserve	amounts	based	on	net	new	home	mortgage	 lending.	 	 The	 return	 of	 such	 reserve	 funds	 to	 the	 financial	 institution	involved	should	only	take	place	once	the	performance	of	the	underlying	mortgages	can	be	assessed	as	 satisfactory	with	 ‘satisfactory’	denoting	a	portfolio	performance	 in	 line	with	that	of	the	best	lending	years.		
5.4	 Introduce	 index-linked	Treasuries	especially	 for	pension	savers	and	pension	
funds	
	 The	 U.S.	 government	 will	 need	 to	 decide	 whether	 it	 is	 has	 struck	 the	 right	 balance	between	getting	its	government	debt	level	funded	at	the	lowest	possible	costs	and			
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																																																																																																																					The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		thereby	benefitting	tax	payers	in	the	short	run,	or	should	it	acknowledge	that	borrowing	at	 costs	 close	 to	 or	 below	 inflation	 level	 constitutes	 a	 penalty	 for	 savers	who	wish	 to	build	up	a	pension	pot	for	future	expenditure.																																																																																																																																														The	U.S.	and	other	governments	already	employ	many	different	rates	 to	reward	savers	depending	on	the	length	of	commitment	of	such	savers	to	fund	government	debt	levels.	No	government	wants	to	fund	its	debt	on	a	daily	rollover	basis;	notwithstanding	that	it	is	easily	the	cheapest	alternative	in	the	short	term.		 Among	all	these	different	rates,	it	must	be	possible	to	create	a	special	category	for	savers	and	savings	institutions	(pension	funds)	on	their	behalf	to	have	the	benefit	of	an	index	linked	Treasury	product,	which	 caters	 for	 long-term	 savers	who	wish	 to	build	up	 and	maintain	 a	 financial	 reserve	 for	 future	 use.	 Such	 index	 linked	 Treasuries	 could	 be	devised	especially	for	one	category	of	savers:	those	households	or	institutions	on	their	behalf	who	want	to	build	up	such	funds	for	use	 in	retirement.	This	means	that	trading	restrictions	could	be	applied	to	prevent	using	such	Treasuries	for	other	purposes	than	intended.	The	benefit	 to	households	would	be	 substantial	 as	 the	 risk	of	 inflation	 level	developments	is	taken	away	from	their	investment	worries.		Drs	Kees	De	Koning	Chorleywood,	U.K.	24th	October	2016		
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